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to adopt more comparable financial statement. We hypothesize that firms subject to higher 
labor-induced operating leverage are more likely to adopt more comparable financial 
statements in order to facilitate more timely employment adjustment which reduces firm risk 
related to labor leverage. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that proxies for labor-
induced operating leverage, such as labor unions, labor intensity, and labor share are 
positively related to financial statement comparability. We also find that financial statement 
comparability increases the sensitivity of hiring to performance change, particularly, for 
negative operating performance, supporting our notion that financial statement comparability 
helps managers’ timelier labor adjustment. Last, we examine whether the improved 
comparability prevents massive layoffs thanks to continuously more timely employment 
adjustment. Consistent with our prediction, we find that comparability reduces the likelihood 
of large-scale layoffs. 
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ABSTRACT: We examine how labor-induced operating leverage shapes managers’ decision 
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Recent literature in financial statement comparability (e.g., De Franco, Kothari, and 
Verdi 2011; Kim, Kraft, and Ryan 2013; Chen, Collins, Kravet, and Mergenthaler 2018; 
Shane, Smith, and Zhang 2014) generally provides evidence that accounting comparability is 
beneficial to capital markets, including both equity and public debt markets and to merger 
and acquisition (M&A) deals. For example, De Franco et al. (2011) document that financial 
statement comparability is positively related to analyst coverage and earnings forecast 
accuracy while negatively related to earnings forecast dispersion, suggesting that financial 
statement comparability lowers the cost of stock analysts’ acquiring and processing 
information, and increases the overall quantity and quality of public information. Chen et al. 
(2018) examine how financial statement comparability affects the performance of M&A 
activities and find that acquirers make better acquisition decisions when target firms’ 
financial statement is more comparable with that of industry peer firms.  
While most prior studies focus on the effects and consequences of financial statement 
comparability on various outcome variables, our knowledge is very limited to the 
determinants of financial statement comparability, particularly, how corporate operational 
characteristics affect managers’ incentives to adopt financial statement comparability. In this 
paper, we attempt to fill this void in the literature by examining how financial statement 
comparability is affected by labor induced operating leverage (hereafter, labor leverage) 
which recently attracts a lot of attention from the accounting and finance literatures (e.g., 
Donangelo, Gourio, Kehrig, and Palacios 2019; Favilukis, Lin, and Zhao 2020).  
Sticky employee wages facilitate a negative economic shock leads to higher labor 
leverage. During the economic downturn, employee wages decline more slowly compared to 
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the sales decline resulting in higher labor expenses relative to the firm size which potentially 
would be detrimental to firm value. For example, labor leverage increases credit risk as pre-
committed wage payments make interest payments riskier during economic downturns. 
Consistent with this perspective, Favilukis et al. (2020) show that firms with high labor 
leverage are less likely to issue debt due to the increased credit risk arising from labor 
leverage, suggesting that labor market friction is the first-order effect on credit market 
friction. Despite the importance of labor leverage in various corporate decisions documented 
in recent finance studies, empirical evidence on the importance of labor leverage in managers’ 
financial reporting choices is still scarce.  
This study examines whether firms subject to higher labor leverage are more likely to 
adopt more comparable financial statements. Higher labor leverage generally leads to 
managers' greater incentives to reduce inherent operating risk and thus we hypothesize that 
managers with higher labor leverage are more likely to adopt more comparable financial 
statements which facilitate their making better inferences about economic similarities and 
differences across firms. Financial statement comparability allows managers to compare their 
performance with other peers in the same industry more efficiently by improving information 
availability and lowering information asymmetry (e.g., Kim, Kraft, and Ryan 2013; Fang, Li, 
Xin, and Zhang 2016; Stallings 2017; Choi, Choi, Myers, and, Ziebart 2019. The effective 
comparison with industry peers allows managers to better predict their future performance 
along with economic events, resulting in timelier adjustment of their labor share. Given rigid 
nature of wages, we predict that managers would decrease risk related to labor leverage by 
reducing labor forces more quickly or not hiring additional labor forces to prepare for 
negative economic shocks during economic downturn. Furthermore, managers have another 
incentive to increase the financial statement comparability as it encourages rank-and-file 
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employees to more easily accept managers’ decisions to reduce labor forces when their firms’ 
earnings performance is more comparable to peer firms in the same industry. 
To test our hypothesis, we first examine the relation between labor leverage and 
financial statement comparability. We measure labor leverage in four ways. Labor intensity, 
the first proxy for labor leverage, is measured as the number of employees scaled by total 
assets (e.g. Hilary 2006). Maintaining a labor force involves certain costs which are largely 
fixed in nature because of costly hiring and training costs and continuing wage expenses. As 
the fixed portion of labor costs is more substantial for firms with higher labor intensity, the 
mismatch between wage payments and corresponding revenues becomes more severe, 
leading to the higher labor leverage (e.g., Donangelo et al. 2019; Jung, Lee, Weber, and Yang 
2020). The second proxy for labor leverage is labor union strength. The literature documents 
that stronger labor unions increase operating leverage by making wages stickier and layoffs 
costlier (e.g., Chen et al. 2011; Jung et al. 2020). Our third proxy for labor leverage is labor 
share. Donangelo et al. (2019) theoretically suggest and empirically validate that labor share, 
the relative size and inflexibility of labor expenses, leads to a form of operating leverage to 
firms. Following Donangelo et al. (2019), we measure labor share as the ratio of imputed 
labor expenses to value-added. Lastly, to capture various aspects of labor leverage, we create 
the composite measure of labor leverage based on aforementioned three individual proxies. 
We measure financial statement comparability following De Franco et al. (2011) who 
propose an approach to measuring comparability based on the similarity of the mapping 
between earnings and stock returns. De Franco et al. (2011) define the accounting system as a 
function which maps the economic events to the financial statements. Our primary 
comparability measure uses the industry median of pairwise comparability estimated for all 
the peer firms in the same industry. As alternative proxies, we also employ the industry mean 
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of pairwise comparability and cash flow based comparability measure, similar to Barth et al. 
(2012). 
Based on 44,400 firm year observations from 1992 to 2017, we find that all proxies 
for labor leverage are positively associated with financial statement comparability, suggesting 
that firms with higher labor leverage tend to adopt more comparable financial statements. To 
control for the potential timing bias in our model, we also conduct three additional tests by 
including the lagged-comparability measure as an additional control variable (Hamm et al. 
2018; Wooldridge 2000), and using only every fourth year of observations and four year 
ahead comparability measure to eliminate the timing overlap between comparability variable 
and labor share proxies (Imhof et al. 2018). We confirm that our results are robust to these 
alternative specifications.  
To mitigate the endogeneity concern that unobservable firm characteristics affect both 
labor leverage and comparability, we employ right-to-work (RTW) regulation as an 
exogenous shock to a change in comparability measure. The literature suggests that this 
exogenous shock significantly decreases employees’ bargaining power, and thereby we 
expect that managers will face relatively lower level of labor leverage. Consistent with our 
main results and our prediction, we find that comparability is significantly lower for firms in 
states after adopting RTW regulations, suggesting that our results are not driven by the 
endogeneity concern.  
To further strengthen our main results, we also implement several tests for cross-
sectional variations in the relation between labor share and comparability. We expect that 
firms more subject to future negative economic shocks will have greater incentives to reduce 
risk arising from labor leverage and thus, to adopt comparable financial statements. 
Employing three proxies for the riskiness or volatility of business environments: stock return 
volatility (Chen et al. 2018), product market competition (Hamm et al. 2018), and firm-level 
   
 
 5 
uncertainty based on the occurrence of risk-relevant terms in the conference call transcripts 
(Hassan et al. 2019), we find that the positive relation between labor share and comparability 
is more pronounced when firms are more likely to face future negative economic shocks. 
Our hypothesis is based on the notion that managers are more likely to adopt financial 
statement comparability to facilitate timelier labor adjustments. To support our claim, we 
examine whether financial statement comparability facilitates firms’ timelier labor 
adjustments, particularly during negative economic shocks. Consistent with our notion, we 
find that comparability indeed increases the sensitivity of hiring to performance change, 
particularly, when they have negative operating performance. These results suggest that 
comparability facilitates managers’ efficient firing decision when their firm performance is 
poor.  
If comparability promotes timelier labor decisions, the incidence of large-scale layoffs 
which is detrimental to firm value and firm reputation (Gunderson et al. 1997; Flanagan and 
O’Shaughnessy 2005) is less likely to occur while the incidence of timely fine-tuning labor 
decisions is more likely. Thus, we predict that comparability leads to the decrease in the 
incidence of large-scale layoffs and the increase in the incidence of fine-tuning employment 
decisions. Consistent with our prediction, we find a negative (positive) relation between 
comparability and the likelihood of layoff (fine-tuning of employment decisions). 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the 
literature on financial statement comparability by providing evidence that labor leverage 
affects managers’ incentives to issue comparable financial statements. Different from most 
prior research which focuses on the consequences of financial statement comparability, our 
findings add to the literature by identifying labor induced operating leverage as a determinant 
of financial statement comparability and suggest that firm operational characteristics play an 
important role in shaping managers’ decisions regarding the comparability of financial 
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statements. In addition, we contribute to the accounting literature that explores the benefits of 
financial statement comparability. By showing that financial statement comparability 
facilitates labor-related decisions in a timelier manner, we extend the growing literature that 
examines benefits of financial statement comparability on corporate decisions to employment 
decisions. Collectively, our findings corroborate that financial statement comparability is 
beneficial for firms who have concerns regarding labor leverage. Lastly, our paper adds to the 
literature on corporate labor. We find novel evidence on the effect of labor leverage on 
corporate financial reporting, enhancing our understanding of how labor issues influence 
firms’ financial reporting strategy and choices.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 outlines the sample selection process and 
describes the measures and research design. Section 4 discusses the main findings. Section 5 
presents additional analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Literature review on financial statement comparability  
Given the increase in business complexity and diversity of accounting method choice, 
standard setters and regulators have emphasized the importance of financial statement 
comparability as an enhancing characteristic of financial reporting and put considerable 
amount of efforts into improving the comparability of financial statements. Indeed, recently, 
both Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) highlight the importance of financial statement comparability, stating that 
comparability in financial reporting is the primary reason for developing accounting 
standards (FASB 1980, para. 112).  
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As a distinct attribute of financial reporting, financial statement comparability 
facilitates financial users to identify similarities and differences among firms and contributes 
to the information users’ making better decision by increasing information availability, 
lowering information acquisition cost, and reducing information asymmetry. De Franco et al. 
(2011) introduce a novel measure of comparability and suggest that financial statement 
comparability improves overall quantity and quality of information environment — firms 
with high financial statement comparability have greater analyst coverage, more accurate 
analyst forecasts, and less dispersion among analysts. In this respect, a strand of literature 
examines the efficacy of comparability in improving the information environment of capital 
market participants such as shareholders, debtholders and managers. Stallings (2017) shows 
that greater financial statement comparability increases the information content of earnings 
and Choi et al. (2019) show that financial statement comparability improves stock price 
informativeness, supporting the notion that comparability decreases the stock investors’ cost 
of gathering and processing firm-specific information. Similarly, Imhof, Seavey, and Smith 
(2017) report that comparability is associated with lower cost of equity capital. Kim, Kraft, 
and Ryan (2013) and Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang (2016) find that financial statement 
comparability decreases credit spreads of bonds as well as loan spread of syndicated loans, 
implying that comparability alleviates information uncertainty around debt markets. Recently, 
Chen et al. (2018) report that greater financial statement comparability leads to more efficient 
acquisition decisions, suggesting that comparability enables managers to better understand 
and evaluate the target firms and fosters more efficient capital allocation. Recently, Ahn, 
Choi, and Yun (2020) find that financial statement comparability increases the marginal 
value of cash holdings by facilitating monitoring of managers. Overall, previous studies 
demonstrate that financial statement comparability is relevant to financial statement users’ 
   
 
 8 
understanding in firm’s fundamentals and thus is demanded by capital market participants 
and regulators. 
Despite the widely recognized benefits of financial statement comparability, there is 
scant literature on the determinants of financial statement comparability. Several studies 
examine whether and how the adoption of IFRS affects financial statement comparability 
(e.g., Barth, Landsman, Lang, and Williams 2012; Yip and Young 2012; Neel 2017). Some 
recent papers examine whether economic agents and institutional incentives affect firms’ 
implementation of comparable financial statements. For instance, Francis, Pinnuck, and 
Watanabe (2014) find that audit firms play a role in shaping financial statement 
comparability. Specifically, financial statements are more comparable if both clients are 
audited by the same Big 4 auditors, suggesting that auditor style has a systematic effect on 
financial statement comparability. Endrawes, Feng, Lu, and Shan (2018) find that the size of 
audit committee and its financial and accounting expertise are positively associated with 
financial statement comparability. Imhof et al. (2018) show that higher competition induces 
managers to issue less comparable financial statements to avoid the proprietary costs of 
financial reporting. 
Considering the important role of managers as economic agents in preparing financial 
statements and reporting incentives faced by them, understanding managers’ strategic 
decisions of adopting financial statement comparability is essential although our knowledge 
on this issue is very limited. Particularly, the extent to which firm operational characteristics 
such as labor leverage affects managers’ adoption of financial statement comparability is 
under-explored.  
2.2. Literature review on corporate labor  
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Labor costs, the essential of business, not just represent a major source of expenses 
for firms1, but embody an important source of operating leverage (i.e., the sensitivity of 
operating profits to economic shocks) since wages are stickier than firm’s productivity 
(Danthine and Donaldson 2002; Lev and Zambon 2003). The inflexible nature of labor costs 
induces relatively higher share of fixed costs which are more sensitive to economic shocks, 
namely higher operating leverage.2 Belo, Lin, and Bazdresch (2014) document that firms’ 
hiring decisions incur high adjustment costs. Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) show that 
labor protections increase operating leverage by making labor costs more rigid, crowding out 
financial leverage. Chen, Kacperczyk, and Molina (2011) report that labor unions increase 
operating leverage by making wages sticky and layoffs costly and by intervening timely 
restructurings. Recently, Donangelo, Gourio, Kehrig, and Palacios (2019) suggest labor share 
as a proxy for labor leverage and find that it amplifies firm risk in a way analogous to 
financial leverage. 
A growing body of finance and economics research sheds light on the role of labor 
leverage in shaping firm risk and management decisions. Favilukis and Lin (2016) and Chen, 
Kacperczyk, and Molina (2011) report that labor leverage leads to more volatile return on 
equity and higher cost of equity, respectively. Donangelo, Gourio, Kehrig, and Palacios 
(2019) and Rosett (2001) find that labor leverage induces firms to be exposed to higher level 
of systematic risk. Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) indicate that labor leverage affects firms’ 
capital structure decisions by lowering financial leverage. Recently, Favilukis, Lin, and Zhao 
(2020) show that firms with high labor leverage issue less debt in response to the increased 
firm’s credit risk arising from labor leverage. Collectively, the findings suggest that managers 
of firms with high labor leverage have enough incentives to reduce the costs and risks 
 
1 As an important factor of production, labor-related costs are economically significant (Hamm, Jung, and Lee 
2018), which comprises more than half of gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States (Gollin 2002). 
2 Higher share of fixed costs increases operating profitability in positive economy shocks, while it decreases 
operating profitability in negative economy shocks. 
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brought by labor leverage. A number of recent studies (e.g., Chino 2016; Klasa, Maxwell, 
and Ortiz-Molina 2009) support this perspective by showing that managers moderate levels 
of payout policy and cash holdings in response to organized labor. 
2.3. Hypothesis 
We hypothesize that managers of such firms have greater incentives to reduce 
operating risk arising from labor leverage and thus, tend to increase financial statement 
comparability since it helps managers to better compare their performance with other peers in 
the same industry (Chen et al. 2018). Better comparison with the peer firms facilitates 
managers’ timelier labor hiring/firing decisions, particularly during negative economic 
shocks, when operating risk due to labor leverage is higher.  
Prior studies suggest that accounting information about sales, cost of goods sold, 
SG&A expense, and inventories reported in their financial statements is valuable for 
forecasting future demand and costs (e.g., Curtis et al. 2014). Since firms within the same 
industry are affected by similar economic conditions related to demand, supply, labor 
availability, and input costs, such peer firms’ financial statement can improve manager's 
investment decisions by allowing managers to forecast the estimates of aggregate demand 
and supply conditions more accurately (e.g., Bonsall IV et al., 2013). Furthermore, peer firms’ 
financial statements can reduce uncertainty about expected future cash flows from an 
investment project, resulting in lower adjustment costs such as less hiring/training new 
employees. By lowering adjustment costs, peer-firm financial statements help managers 
respond in a timely manner to changes in investment opportunities and make more efficient 
investment decisions (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2007).  
We argue that if a firm’s accounting information is more comparable to that of 
industry peers, the manager would be able to better predict its future performance and thereby 
decreases operating risk related to labor leverage by reducing labor forces more promptly to 
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prepare for upcoming negative economic shocks. Considering the sticky nature of wages, 
labor costs are only able to be adjusted by firing the existing employees or not hiring the new 
employees. In addition, financial statement comparability also helps rank-and-file employees 
more easily accept manager’s decision to cut labor forces without disputes as it allows their 
better understanding firms’ financial performance as well as industry-wide circumstances.  
Therefore, we posit that for firms with high labor leverage, managers will issue more 
comparable financial statements, which leads to our main hypothesis.  
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s labor leverage will be positively associated with 
financial statement comparability. 
 
3. Sample, variables, and research design 
3.1. Sample  
We use Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases to 
obtain our main variables such as labor leverage, financial statement comparability, and other 
firm characteristics. Data on analyst coverage and labor unions are obtained from the I/B/E/S 
and Union Membership and Coverage Database (www.unionstats.com), respectively. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at their 1 and 99 percent levels to reduce the effects of 
outliers on our results. The above procedure yields a final sample of 44,400 firm-years for the 
main analysis over the period of 1992 to 2017. 
3.2. Variables  
Financial statement comparability 
De Franco et al. (2011) develop financial statement comparability measure by 
defining accounting system as a function that maps economic events to financial statements. 
If two firms have similar mappings between economic events and financial statements, then 
their accounting systems are viewed as comparable. Empirically, we employ stock returns to 
   
 
 12 
proxy for firm’s economic event and earnings to proxy for its reflection on financial 
statement: 
E(Earnings)it = 𝛼𝛼 +𝛽𝛽1Returnit                                        (1) 
Financial statement comparability between two firms (i.e., firm i and firm j) is estimated as 
the negative value of the average absolute difference between the predicted earnings using 
two firms’ mapping functions for the past 16 quarters as follows:   
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = − 1
16
× ∑ |𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|−15𝑖𝑖=0               (2) 
The higher Comparability indicates higher financial reporting comparability between two 
firms. 
Our main measure of financial statement comparability is defined as the median value 
of Comparability with all peer firms in the same industry (based on two digit SIC code), 
CompAcct. As alternative measures, we also use the mean value of Comparability, 
CompAcctAlt1 and a measure developed by Barth et al. (2012), CompAcctAlt2, which maps 
net income into cash flow, instead of returns into earnings. To estimate CompAcctAlt2, we 
use following models (3) and (4):  
E(CF)it = 𝛼𝛼 +𝛽𝛽1NIit                                                                       (3) 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = − 1
16
× ∑ |𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|−15𝑖𝑖=0      (4) 
Labor leverage  
The smoothness of labor compensation relative to firms’ cash inflows leads to a labor-
induced form of operating leverage. Stated differently, the inflexible nature of labor costs 
results in relatively higher share of fixed costs which are more sensitive to economic shocks, 
namely higher operating leverage. We measure labor leverage in four ways. As the first proxy 
for labor leverage, we use labor intensity, LaborIntensity, defined as the number of 
employees deflated by total assets (e.g. Hilary 2006). Building and maintaining a labor force 
involves certain costs that are largely fixed in nature due to hiring and training costs and 
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paying wages. As the fixed portion of labor costs is substantial, the mismatch problem in the 
timing between wage payments and corresponding revenues becomes more severe, 
generating significant amount of adjustment costs related to labor. The significant amount of 
pre-committed wages is expected to result in high labor leverage for more labor-intensive 
firms. 
The second proxy for labor leverage is UNION, a firm-level labor union strength 
based on the Current Population Survey. Labor union strength is widely considered as one of 
the determinants of labor-induced operating leverage. Chen et al. (2011) claim that labor 
unions increase operating leverage by making wages sticky and layoffs costly. UNION is 
calculated as the product of industry-level percentage of union membership and firm-level 
labor intensity, following the accounting literature (e.g. Hamm et al. 2018; Hilary 2006). This 
proxy hinges on the assumption that firm-specific union strength can be affected by both 
industry level union membership and the significance of labor at firm level. For example, 
even when a firm is operating in a highly unionized industry, if the number of employees is 
small, the effect of industry unionization on firm level labor union strength would be minimal.  
The third proxy for labor leverage is extended labor share (hereafter ELS), which is 
based on imputed labor costs using Compustat data. Prior literature uses labor share as a 
proxy for labor leverage and shows that it amplifies firm risk in a way analogous to financial 
leverage (Donangelo et al. 2019). Specifically, labor share indicates the portion of labor 
expense relative to total value added and is calculated as labor expense divided by the sum of 
operating income before depreciation expense, change in inventory of finished goods, and 
labor expense. Of note, this measure (i.e. ELS) addresses the limitation that labor cost 
variable (Compustat item XLR) is only available for approximately 12% of all the Compustat 
firms. Specifically, following Donangelo et al. (2019), ELS is defined as follows: 
ELSit = 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 ,                                                          (5) 
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where LABEXit = labor expenses, defined as the product of Compustat item EMP (i.e., the 
number of employees) and average annual labor cost per employee in the industry which a 








� where firms j ∈ I and I denotes firm i’s 
industry; OIBDPit = operating income before depreciation expense; ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = change in 
inventory of finished goods. 
 Lastly, to mitigate measurement error in the above individual proxies and provide 
evidence based on an overall labor leverage metric, we construct a composite measure of the 
aforementioned individual proxies, Labor_Comp, by taking the average of the decile-ranked 
individual proxies (i.e. LaborIntensity, UNION, and ELS). Then, we employ these four 
measures (i.e. LaborIntensity, UNION, ELS, and Labor_Comp) for our main tests regarding 
the relation between labor leverage and financial statement comparability.3  
3.3. Empirical Model 
 To examine the association between financial statement comparability and labor 
leverage, we estimate the following model (6).  
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 +𝛾𝛾3𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀t                
                                + 𝛾𝛾5𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾6𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾7𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆5𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾8𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖  
                                + 𝛾𝛾9𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾10𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸4𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  + 𝛾𝛾12𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖                
                                +Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + ϵ,                (6)           
where Comparability represents either the main comparability measure (CompAcct) or one of 
two alternative measures (i.e., CompAcctAlt1 or CompAcctAlt2). LaborLeverage refers to one 
of the four proxies for labor leverage (i.e. LaborIntensity, UNION, ELS, and Labor_Comp).  
 
3 For the sake of brevity, we report all additional analysis using our composite measure, Labor_Comp. 
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If a firm’s labor leverage is positively associated with financial statement 
comparability, 𝛾𝛾1 should be positive and statistically significant, supporting H1. We add the 
following control variables representing potential determinants of comparability in the model 
(6): firm size (Size), dividend paying status (DIVDUM), market-to-book ratio (MTB), 
leverage (Leverage), the volatility of cash flows from operations (CFO5), sales volatility 
(SALES5), sales growth (SalesGrowth), and firm age (Age) (e.g. Francis et al. 2014; Imhof et 
al. 2018).  In addition, we control for whether a firm engages a Big 4 auditor (Big4), analyst 
following (Analysts), and bid-ask spread (Spread) to capture information environment (e.g. 
Imhof et al. 2018). Lastly, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included to control 
for variations in financial statement comparability across industry and over year, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered at firm-level to control for serial-dependence due to repeated 
firms in the sample.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for our main variables are presented in Table 1. All the variables 
are defined in more details in the Appendix 1. The mean value of our main measure of 
financial statement comparability (CompAcct) is -2.74, similar to that in prior literature (e.g. 
Imhof et al. 2018). The mean (median) value of the composite measure of labor leverage, 
Labor_Comp, is 6.16 (6.33). In addition, the sample firms are relatively large (mean Size = 
5.74) and highly valued (mean MTB = 2.93). On average, 36% of the sample firms pay 
dividends. The mean value of sales growth, SalesGrowth, is 0.15, indicating that the sample 
firms are, on average, growing. The average firm age is 21.25 in our sample. Our sample 
firms are primarily audited by Big 4 audit firms (71%) and followed by 7.6 stock analysts. 
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 In Table 2, we present Pearson correlations.4 As expected, all the four labor leverage 
proxies are significantly and positively correlated, while still capturing somewhat different 
dimensions of labor leverage. All the comparability measures are also positively correlated 
with each other. As for the relation between labor leverage and financial statement 
comparability, all our proxies for labor leverage (Labor_Comp, LaborIntensity, UNON, and 
ELS) are positively and significantly correlated with all three comparability measures, 
suggesting that firms with higher labor leverage tend to adopt more comparable financial 
statements. These results provide preliminary support for our hypothesis.  
Turning to control variables in our main model, we find that financial statement 
comparability measures are positively (negatively) correlated with firm size, dividends, 
market-to-book ratio, firm age, Big 4 auditors, and analyst coverage (leverage, the volatility 
of cash flow from operations, sales volatility, sales growth, and bid-ask spread). These results 
generally are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kim, Li, Lu, and Yu 2016; Choi et al. 2019), 
indicating that financial statement comparability is higher (lower) for large, dividend paying, 
and old firms with better information environment (i.e., for firms with higher leverage and 
more volatile performance). 
4.2. Main results: The relation between comparability and labor leverage 
Table 3 shows the results from estimating the model (6). Panel A reports the results 
based on our first proxy for labor leverage, LaborIntensity. In the first column, we show the 
results using CompAcct as the dependent variable, while in the latter two columns, we present 
the results using alternative comparability proxies. We find that the coefficients on 
LaborIntensity are positive and statistically significant across all three columns, supporting 
our hypothesis that a firm’s labor leverage is positively associated with financial statement 
comparability. The results when using other proxies for labor leverage such as UNION and 
 
4 Spearman correlation results which are similar with those of Pearson correlation are not tabulated for brevity. 
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ELS are presented in Panels B and C, respectively. Using these alternative labor leverage 
measures, we continue to find a strong and positive relation between labor leverage and 
financial statement comparability. Lastly, we report the results based on the composite labor 
leverage measure, Labor_Comp, in Panel D. Again, we find that the coefficients on 
Labor_Comp are significantly positive, consistent with our hypothesis. In sum, the results 
reported in Table 3 suggest that firms with high labor leverage tend to issue more comparable 
financial statements.  
Turning to control variables, the coefficients are generally consistent with the 
correlation results and our prediction. We find that the coefficients on dividend paying status, 
firm age, and analyst coverage are significantly positive while the coefficients on leverage, 
the volatility of cash flow from operations, sales volatility, sales growth, and bid-ask spread 
are significantly negative. These results suggest that dividend paying, older, less leveraged, 
and less volatile firms and firms with better information environment generally provide more 
comparable financial statements. 
4.3. Robustness tests 
4.3.1 Addressing the potential timing bias in our main specification 
Financial statement comparability measures are calculated over 16 quarters (i.e., four 
years), while labor leverage measures are estimated in the current year, indicating potential 
timing bias in our research design. To mitigate this concern, we conduct three additional tests.  
First, we include four-year (i.e., 16 quarters) lagged comparability measure as an 
additional independent variable in our model (6) (e.g., Hamm et al. 2018; Wooldridge 2000). 
By adding this lagged comparability measure to the model, we control for the portion of 
current year comparability that are strongly correlated to past years’ comparability. Table 4, 
Panel A reports the results after including this lagged-comparability measure as an 
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independent variable5 and we find that the coefficients on Labor_Comp are still positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that out main results remain unchanged after controlling 
for the potential impact of timing bias. Consistent with our expectation, we also confirm that 
the coefficients on the lagged comparability measure are significantly positive.  
Second, to ensure there is no carry-over of information due to the rolling 
measurement period of comparability proxies, we re-estimate the model (6) using only every 
fourth year of observations (i.e. 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016), following 
Imhof et al. (2018). Panel B presents the results using only every fourth year of data and 
shows consistent results with our main findings using the smaller sample. Lastly, we measure 
comparability at year t+4 and regress it on labor leverage at year t to further address the 
potential timing bias in model (6). The results presented in Panel C show that our inferences 
are robust to this modification. 
Overall, our findings are consistent to these alternative specifications, supporting our 
hypothesis that a firm’s labor leverage is positively associated with financial statement 
comparability. 
4.3.2 Exogenous shock 
Our results may be biased due to the endogeneity problem that there could be 
unobserved omitted factors that affect both labor leverage and financial statement 
comparability. Thus, in this section, we attempt to mitigate the effect of the endogeneity on 
our results. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we may consider a change in variables 
specification, but this specification is not appropriate in our research setting due to the 
following reasons. First, our measure of financial statement comparability is calculated over 
rolling 16 quarters (i.e., four-year window) and thus, there is a strong correlation between the 
current period comparability and prior period comparability due to measurement period 
 
5 For brevity, we report the results only based on the composite measure of labor leverage, Labor_Comp, but the 
results based on other proxies for labor leverage are qualitatively similar. Results will be available upon request. 
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overlap amongst quarterly observations. Second, our measures of labor leverage are generally 
too stable over time to adopt the change in variable specification. 
Instead, we utilize the state-level staggered adoption of right-to-work (RTW) laws as 
an exogenous shock to labor (union) strength (e.g. Chava et al. 2019; Matsa 2010) and thus, 
labor leverage in our setting. In the RTW states, workers can be employed in the unionized 
firm without joining the labor union. Workers are protected by the collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated by the union regardless of their registration or payment status with the 
union. Consequently, employers in these RTW states are easier to hire non-unionized 
employees and the union’s bargaining power has been weakened because of their decreased 
resources. Given the fact that labor unions increase operating leverage by making wages 
sticky and layoffs costly (Chen et al. 2011), RTW adoption can lead to lower labor leverage, 
owing to weaker union strength in the RTW states. 
By the end of our sample period, 26 states have introduced the RTW laws. Among 
these, 21 states adopted the RTW laws long before our sample period (i.e. most states 
adopted the RTW laws in the 1940s and 1950s) and five states adopted during our sample 
period including Oklahoma (adopted in 2001), Indiana (adopted in 2012), Michigan (adopted 
in 2013), Wisconsin (adopted in 2015), and West Virginia (adopted in 2016).6 Specifically, 
we create an indicator variable, PostRTW, which takes a value of one for observations after 
the adoption of RTW laws in these five states (i.e. OK, IN, MI, WI, and WV). We use firms 
in the neighboring states of the five treated states as the control group. The neighboring states, 
within the subset of non-RTW states, include Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Then the following model is 
estimated using the neighboring states and the five treated states (Chava et al. 2019). We 
 
6 Kentucky (adopted in 2017) is excluded since our sample period ends in 2017.   
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further include state fixed effects and double-cluster standard errors at the state-year level 
(Petersen 2009). 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 +𝛾𝛾3𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀t +  𝛾𝛾5𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 
              + 𝛾𝛾6𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾7𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆5𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾8𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾9𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾10𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸4𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾11𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 
               + 𝛾𝛾12𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +State Fixed Effects + ϵ                                              (7) 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of estimating the model (7). We find that the 
coefficient on PostRTW is negative and significant, suggesting that firms provide less 
comparable financial statements after the RTW adoption. The results are consistent with our 
prediction that the adoption of RTW laws significantly weakens labor strength and managers 
respond to lower labor leverage by producing less comparable financial statements. As a 
robustness test, we exclude observations if they are within four years after the RTW adoption 
to address the concern that the estimation period of the comparability measure spanning the 
previous four years (i.e., 16 quarters) might hinder correct inferences (e.g. Hamm et al. 2018). 
The results are presented in Panel B. We still find that the coefficient on PostRTW is negative 
and significant, consistent with the results in Panel A. Overall, results in Table 5 support our 
hypothesis that a firm’s labor leverage is positively associated with financial statement 
comparability and strengthen the inferences drawn in our study. 
4.4. Cross-sectional analysis 
Our previous findings indicate that firms subject to higher labor leverage are more 
likely to adopt more comparable financial statements. We expect that firms more vulnerable 
to the future negative economic shocks have even greater incentives to reduce operating risk 
arising from labor leverage. Consequently, these vulnerable firms are more likely to increase 
the financial statement comparability in order to facilitate managers to compare their 
performance with peers (Chen et al. 2018) and to make the labor adjustment decisions in a 
timely manner. Thus, we predict that the positive relation between labor leverage and 
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financial statement comparability is more pronounced for firms subject to more volatile 
economic condition, particularly, future negative economic shocks. To test this prediction, we 
employ three proxies for the riskiness and volatility in the business environment: stock return 
volatility, product market competition, and overall firm-level risk.  
First, we use firm-level stock return volatility to proxy for the uncertainty in operating 
environment (e.g. Boutchkova et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2018) since higher stock return 
volatility indicates the higher likelihood of experiencing negative economic shocks in the 
future. Thus, managers of such firms have more incentives to adopt comparable financial 
statement when their labor leverage is higher. We measure stock return volatility as the 
annualized standard deviation of the firm’s daily returns and create RetVoldummy, an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s stock return volatility is higher than the sample 
median and zero otherwise. Then, we interact this variable with our labor leverage measures. 
The positive coefficient on the interaction term will support our prediction that firms facing 
higher stock return volatility are more likely to adopt comparable financial statement in 
response to their higher labor leverage. Table 6 Panel A presents results on the effect of stock 
return volatility on the relation between labor leverage and financial statement comparability. 
Echoing our expectation, the coefficient on the interaction term between Labor_Comp and 
RetVoldummy is positive and significant at the 1% level. The results support our notion that 
firms subject to higher operating uncertainty have greater incentives to reduce the risk arising 
from labor leverage by increasing financial statement comparability. 
As a second proxy, we use product market competition measure, measured as one 
minus Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The higher value of the inversed HHI index 
indicates more competitive environment within the industry, suggesting the higher likelihood 
of more volatile operating environment (Hamm et al. 2018). Similar with our first measure, 
we create HHIdummy, an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s product market 
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competition is higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Again, we interact this 
competition measure with Labor_Comp. A positive coefficient on the interaction term is 
expected to support our prediction that firms facing a higher level of competition have greater 
incentives to reduce the risk arising from labor leverage by increasing financial statement 
comparability. Results presented in Panel B of Table 6 show that the coefficient on the 
interaction term between Labor_Comp and HHIdummy is significantly positive, consistent 
with our prediction.  
Lastly, we examine the effect of overall firm-level risk on the relation between labor 
leverage and comparability. Based on the textual analysis, the measure of overall firm-level 
risk is calculated as the frequency of synonyms for risk or uncertainty in the quarterly 
earnings conference call transcripts deflated by the length of the transcript (Hassan et al. 
2019). Textual analysis allows this measure to cover various types of firm risk and market 
participants’ views which are not captured in the return volatility measure. Consistent with 
our prior measures, we create a dummy variable, Riskdummy, based on the sample median to 
capture the risk in a firm’s business environment. Then, we interact this Riskdummy with 
Labor_Comp. We expect to have a positive coefficient on the interaction term to support our 
prediction that managers of firms perceiving more risk are more likely to adopt comparable 
financial statement when labor leverage is higher. Results reported in Panel C show that the 
coefficient on the interaction term between Riskdummy and Labor_Comp is significantly 
positive, suggesting that managers’ perceived risk strengthens the positive relation between 
labor leverage and comparability.  
Overall, Table 6 shows that the positive relation between labor leverage and financial 
statement comparability is more pronounced if firms face higher uncertainty and more 
volatile environment.  
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5. Additional analysis 
5.1. Financial statement comparability and the responsiveness of labor decision 
To support our main argument underlying the effect of labor leverage on financial 
statement comparability, we further examine whether more comparable financial statement 
facilitates firms’ timelier labor adjustments. If financial statement comparability helps 
managers better predict the firm’s future performance along with underlying economic events 
and allows managers/rank-and-file employees to better understand the labor decision, 
managers’ employment decision will become more sensitive to firm performance in order to 
reduce operating risk arising from labor leverage. In particular, we argue that managers with 
better understanding in future economic condition would reduce the labor forces in a timelier 
manner in response to the negative economic shocks to decrease operating risk related to 
labor leverage.  
To test our argument, we follow Benmelech et al. (2015). We augment their model 
with a comparability measure and its interaction with a change in ROA, a proxy for firm 
performance.7 Specifically, we estimate the following model (8): 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 +𝛾𝛾3𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 
        +𝛾𝛾4𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖−1                            
          +𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾6𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 × 
                     𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖−1 +∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 
                    +𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 + ϵ,                    (8) 
where Chg_Emp is the percentage change in the number of employees from year t-1 to t and 
it is obtained from Compustat (e.g., Jung et al. 2014; Benmelech et al. 2015; Falato and Liang 
2016). Chg_ROA is change in return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary 
 
7 While we use the change in ROA to proxy for firm performance, there is a possibility that managers would not 
rely on the change in ROA when they evaluate their performance. Rather, managers may use ROA when they 
make the labor-related decision (e.g., Pinnuck and Lillis 2007). To address this concern, we employ ROA as an 
alternative measure of performance benchmark and find that the results based on ROA are qualitatively similar 
to those based on the change in ROA. 
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items divided by average total assets. Chg_ROADEC is a dummy variable for the decrease in 
ROA change and zero otherwise.  
To consider the asymmetric relation between employee hiring and ROA change for 
ROA increases vs. ROA decreases, we additionally include Chg_ROADEC and interact it 
with comparability measure. We predict the coefficient 𝛾𝛾3  to be significantly positive, 
suggesting that comparability helps managers’ timely employment decision in response to 
firm performance. We further expect the coefficient 𝛾𝛾6  to be significantly positive. If 
comparability facilitates managers’ timely employment decision in bad times to a larger 
extent (i.e., ROA decreases) relative to good times (i.e., ROA increases), 𝛾𝛾6  should be 
significantly positive. We also include a set of control variables that have been suggested by 
prior studies to affect managers’ employment decision (e.g. Benmelech et al. 2015; 
Benmelech et al. 2018). Specifically, Tobin’s Q (Q) is included to control for the potential 
impact of firm’s investment opportunities on employment decisions; Firm size (Size) is to 
control for the relation between firm size and employment decisions; Leverage (Leverage), 
asset maturity (Maturity), and credit rating dummy (CreditRating) are to control for the 
possible impact of capital structure on labor decisions. We further control for the level and 
growth of capital expenditures (Capex and CapexGrowth) to rule out the mechanical relation 
between labor decision and capital constraints. Industry and year fixed effects are included to 
control for variations in labor decisions across industries and over time, respectively. All 
regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors that are clustered by 
firm. We also provide detailed variable definitions in Appendix 1. 
Table 7 presents the regression results for the impact of financial statement 
comparability on the responsiveness of labor decisions to performance change. We first 
examine the relation between performance and employee hiring. Results in the first column 
show that the coefficient on ROA change is significantly positive, suggesting that managers 
   
 
 25 
increase hiring when performance is improved. Results of estimating the model (8) are 
reported in the second column. We find that the coefficient on 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 ×
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 (𝛾𝛾3) is not significant, while the coefficient on 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 ×
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖−1 (𝛾𝛾6) is significantly positive, indicating that comparability 
facilitates managers’ firing decision when firm performance is poor. 8  The insignificant 
coefficient on 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 (𝛾𝛾3) implies that comparability does not play a 
significant role in managers’ hiring decision when labor leverage doesn’t impose much 
frictions on the firm’s operation.  
5.2. Financial statement comparability and corporate layoffs 
To corroborate our findings that comparability increases the sensitivity of corporate 
employment to firm performance, we further examine whether comparability reduces the 
incidence of corporate large-scale layoffs and increases the incidence of fine-tuning 
employment decisions. If comparability enables timelier labor decisions, then the incidence 
of sluggish and untimely large-scale layoffs that is detrimental to firm value and firm 
reputation (Gunderson et al. 1997; Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy 2005) should decrease. In a 
similar vein, the incidence of drastic change in labor should decrease while the incidence of 
fine-tuning change in labor should increase. To validate our argument that comparability 
reduces the incidence of large-scale layoffs and decreases (increases) the incidence of large-
scale change in labor decisions (fine-tuning labor decisions), we estimate the following 
models (9), (10), and (11): 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 − 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 +∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘   
                                            +  𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 + ϵ     (9), 
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 − 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘   
                                                          + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 + ϵ            (10), 
 
8  As a robustness test, we also employ two alternative measures of comparability: CompAcctAlt1 and 
CompAcctAlt2 instead of CompAcct in the model (8). Results (untabulated) based on these alternative measures 
are generally consistent with those based on our primary comparability measure.  
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𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 − ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘   
                                            +  𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 + 𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 + ϵ           (11), 
where Large-scale layoff is an indicator variable which equals one if a percentage change in 
the number of employees over the year is less than -10% and zero otherwise. Large-scale 
change in labor is an indicator variable equals one if the absolute value of a percentage 
change in the number of employees over year is greater than 10% and zero otherwise. Micro-
hiring management is an indicator variable which equals one if the percentage change in the 
number of employees over year is between -1% and 1%.9 We include control variables used 
in model (8). All regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors that 
are clustered by firm. The detailed definitions on variables are presented in Appendix 1. 
Table 8 reports the results of estimating the effect of comparability on the incidence 
of large-scale layoffs, large-scale change in labor decisions, and fine-tuning labor decisions. 
The coefficient on 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1(𝛾𝛾1) is significantly negative in the first column, suggesting 
that comparability lowers the incidence of large-scale layoffs. The coefficients on 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1(𝛾𝛾1) are significantly negative in the second column and positive in the third 
column, indicating that comparability significantly decreases the incidence of large-scale 
change in labor decisions and increases the incidence of fine-tuning labor decisions. Overall, 
the results suggest that financial statement comparability is beneficial in facilitating timelier 
adjustment of labor and reducing the likelihood of layoffs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Prior literature documents financial statement comparability as a vital accounting 
attribute desired by the users and has provided evidence on the benefits of comparable 
financial statements for capital market participants. However, relatively little attention has 
 
9 Using alternative cutoff points for large-scale labor change definition (e.g., -15% or -20%) and fine-tuning 
definition (e.g., between -0.5% and 0.5%), we find qualitatively similar results to what we tabulate in Table 8.  
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been paid to the determinants of financial statement comparability and its effects on corporate 
decisions regarding labor. In this study, we explore the importance of financial statement 
comparability in corporate employment by examining labor-induced operating leverage as a 
determinant of financial statement comparability and how comparable financial statements 
are beneficial for managers’ employment decisions.  
Using a sample of 44,400 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2017, we find that 
labor leverage is positively associated with financial statement comparability, suggesting that 
firms with higher labor leverage tend to adopt more comparable financial statements. To 
address a concern on endogeneity issues, we utilize right-to-work (RTW) regulation change 
as an exogenous shock to examine the effect of labor leverage on financial statement 
comparability. We find that comparability is lower for firms in states adopting RTW 
regulations since RTW laws reduce employees’ bargaining power and thus, operating risk 
due to labor leverage. Moreover, several cross-sectional tests show that the effect of labor 
leverage on financial statement comparability is stronger when firms are more likely to face 
future negative economic shocks. Taken together, these findings highlight that managers who 
have greater incentives to reduce operating risk owing to labor leverage tend to adopt more 
comparable financial statements. Lastly, we provide corroborating evidence that financial 
statement comparability increases the sensitivity of hiring to performance change and thus, 
reduces the likelihood of large-scale layoff. The results suggest that financial statement 
comparability facilitates more timely employment adjustments in response to the negative 
economic shocks, supporting our argument that financial statement comparability plays a 
significant role in mitigating the labor leverage. 
Overall, our study contributes to the literature on financial statement comparability. 
By identifying labor leverage as a determinant of financial statement comparability, this 
paper advances our understanding in managers’ incentives to adopt comparable financial 
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statements. Furthermore, we extend a stream of accounting research that explores the benefits 
of financial statement comparability by providing evidence that financial statement 
comparability shapes labor-related decisions in a timelier manner. Finally, we add to the 
literature regarding corporate labor by showing the influences of labor leverage on corporate 
financial reporting, providing new insights on the effects of labor-related costs.  
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CompAcct  Median pairwise comparability for all peer firms in the same SIC2 industry as firm i during year t.   
CompAcctAlt1 Mean pairwise comparability for all peer firms in the same SIC2 industry as firm i during year t.  
CompAcctAlt2 
Median pairwise comparability for all peer firms in the same 
SIC2 industry as firm i during year t, based on cash flow and net 
income. (Barth et al. 2012) 
Labor_Comp Composite measure of labor leverage, average ranks of the individual proxies (LaborIntensity, UNION, and ELS) 
LaborIntensity Number of employees divided by total assets 
UNION 
Firm-level union measure computed as a product of the 
industry-level unionization rate and firm-level labor intensity, 
following Hilary (2006) 
ELS 
Extended labor share, defined as labor expenses divided by 
value-added, following Donangelo et al. (2019). Specifically, 
ELS it = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 , where LABEX captures 
labor expenses, defined as the product of Compustat item EMP 
(number of employees) and the average annual labor cost per 
employee in the industry during the year.   
Size Natural logarithm of the total assets  
DIVDUM Indicator variable set to 1 if the firm issues dividend, otherwise zero 
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity  
Leverage Sum of long-term and short-term debts divided by total assets  
CFO5 Standard deviation in cash flows from operations divided by total assets over the prior five years 
SALES5 Standard deviation in sales divided by total assets over the prior five years 
SalesGrowth Percentage change in firm sales 
Age Firm age 
Big 4 Indicator variable set to 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big 4 firm, otherwise zero 
Analysts Number of analysts following the firm 
Spread 
Absolute value of the annual average difference between daily 
bid and ask price, divided by closing price, and multiplied by 
100 
PostRTW Indicator variable equals one for the observations after the RTW adoption, otherwise zero 
RetVoldummy Indicator variable equals one if the firm-level stock return volatility is above the sample median, otherwise zero 
HHIdummy 
Indicator variable equals one if the inverse of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index measured at the 3-digit SIC level is above the 
sample median, otherwise zero 
Riskdummy Indicator variable equals one if the overall firm-level risk is 
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above the sample median, otherwise zero  
Chg_Emp Percentage change in the number of employees 
Capex Capital expenditure scaled by beginning of total assets 
CapexGrowth Percentage change in capital expenditure 
Q Tobin’s Q, measured as market value of the firm over the replacement cost of its assets 
Liquidity Cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets 
Maturity Net property, plant, and equipment divided by annual depreciation expenses 
CreditRating Indicator variable equals one if the firm has a credit rating from Standard & Poor’s, otherwise zero 
ROA Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets 
Chg_ROA Change in return on assets 
Chg_ROADEC Indicator variable equals one if Chg_ROA is negative, otherwise zero 
Chg_ROAINC Indicator variable equals one if Chg_ROA is positive, otherwise zero 
Large-scale layoff  Indicator variable equals one if the number of employees decreases greater than 10%, otherwise zero 
Large-scale change in 
labor 
Indicator variable equals one if the number of employees varies 
more than 10%, otherwise zero 
Micro-hiring 
management  
Indicator variable equals one if the number of employees varies 
less than 1%, otherwise zero 
   
 
 34 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
CompAcct 44,400 -2.74 2.64 -3.16 -1.83 -1.20 
CompAcctAlt1 44,400 -3.53 2.34 -4.06 -2.87 -2.14 
CompAcctAlt2 37,712 -5.73 3.53 -6.76 -4.72 -3.48 
Labor_Comp 44,400 6.16 2.13 4.67 6.33 8.00 
LaborIntensity 44,400 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
UNION 44,400 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.08 
ELS 44,400 0.53 0.32 0.29 0.63 0.80 
Size 44,400 5.74 2.21 4.09 5.67 7.30 
DIVDUM 44,400 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MTB 44,400 2.93 5.58 1.22 2.03 3.46 
Leverage 44,400 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.32 
CFO5 44,400 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09 
SALES5 44,400 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.13 0.22 
SalesGrowth 44,400 0.15 0.64 -0.04 0.07 0.19 
AGE 44,400 21.25 14.38 10.00 16.00 29.00 
Big 4 44,400 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Analysts 44,400 7.60 8.42 1.00 5.00 12.00 
Spread 44,400 1.80 2.32 0.18 0.96 2.46 
PostRTW 44,400 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RetVol 44,400 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.16 
HHI 44,400 0.82 0.17 0.77 0.88 0.93 
Risk 25,010 59.49 49.73 25.71 49.29 80.71 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of regression variables used in our analyses for the full sample. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix 1. 
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Table 2   
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
CompAcct                   
CompAcctAlt1 0.97*                  
CompAcctAlt2 0.35* 0.29*                 
Labor_Comp 0.21* 0.20* 0.29*                
LaborIntensity 0.04* 0.04* 0.02* 0.52*               
UNION 0.07* 0.09* 0.11* 0.57* 0.61*              
ELS 0.22* 0.18* 0.35* 0.80* 0.31* 0.27*             
Size 0.22* 0.16* 0.23* -0.12* -0.22* -0.15* 0.02*            
DIVDUM 0.24* 0.21* 0.31* 0.17* -0.04* 0.08* 0.15* 0.44*           
MTB 0.01* 0.02* -0.17* -0.07* -0.02* -0.03* -0.10* 0.14* -0.01*          
Leverage -0.08* -0.06* 0.12* 0.05* -0.04* 0.06* 0.04* 0.06* 0.05* -0.08*         
CFO5 -0.25* -0.21* -0.61* -0.21* 0.01 -0.04* -0.29* -0.27* -0.27* 0.08* -0.05*        
SALES5 -0.13* -0.11* -0.20* 0.06* 0.19* 0.12* -0.03* -0.26* -0.17* 0.01* -0.04* 0.30*       
SalesGrowth -0.06* -0.05* -0.17* -0.02* 0.04* 0.03* -0.06* -0.01 -0.09* 0.07* -0.00 0.15* 0.04*      
Age 0.19* 0.16* 0.32* 0.09* -0.08* 0.02* 0.11* 0.40* 0.50* -0.03* 0.08* -0.25* -0.16* -0.10*     
Big 4 0.052* 0.02* 0.07* -0.07* -0.09* -0.10* 0.01 0.35* 0.10* 0.02* 0.04* -0.09* -0.10* -0.01 0.09*    
Analysts 0.20* 0.16* 0.14* -0.13* -0.17* -0.13* -0.01 0.79* 0.25* 0.11* 0.05* -0.20* -0.18* 0.01 0.25* 0.26*   
Spread -0.14* -0.06* -0.15* 0.14* 0.19* 0.19* -0.03* -0.60* -0.24* -0.07* 0.08* 0.18* 0.19* -0.03* -0.24* -0.24* -0.42*  
PostRTW 0.03* 0.02* 0.03* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* 0.04* 0.05* -0.01 0.02* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 0.08* -0.00 0.02* -0.05* 
Notes: Pearson correlations are shown below the diagonal. * denotes significance at the 5 percent level (using a two-tailed test). Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix 1.
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Table 3  
The relation between labor leverage and financial statement comparability 
 
Panel A: Results based on labor intensity 
  Dependent Variable = Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct  CompAcctAlt1 CompAcctAlt2     
LaborIntensity t 8.047*** 4.342*** 14.904*** 
 (4.174) (2.598) (5.837) 
Size t 0.026 -0.018 -0.010 
 (0.654) (-0.490) (-0.403) 
DIVDUM t  0.453*** 0.275*** 0.257*** 
 (7.211) (4.947) (4.132) 
MTB t  0.001 0.004 -0.062*** 
 (0.221) (1.456) (-10.831) 
Leverage t  -1.504*** -1.225*** 0.393** 
 (-10.488) (-9.984) (2.171) 
CFO5 t  -3.608*** -2.467*** -27.111*** 
 (-5.613) (-5.010) (-35.764) 
SALES5 t  -0.822*** -0.788*** -0.364* 
 (-5.025) (-5.796) (-1.944) 
SalesGrowth t -0.093*** -0.057*** -0.453*** 
 (-3.815) (-2.681) (-11.035) 
Age t 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 
 (4.043) (3.998) (11.791) 
Big 4 t -0.014 -0.005 0.134** 
 (-0.316) (-0.126) (2.175) 
Analysts t 0.035*** 0.034*** -0.001 
 (4.770) (5.178) (-0.149) 
Spread t -0.170*** -0.139*** -0.095*** 
 (-12.275) (-11.462) (-6.287) 
Constant -2.564*** -3.195*** -4.293*** 
 (-13.796) (-19.914) (-28.832) 
        
Observations 44,400 44,400 37,712 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217 0.257 0.474 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
 
 
Panel B: Results based on union 
  Dependent Variable = Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct  CompAcctAlt1  CompAcctAlt2     
UNION t 0.585*** 0.341* 1.265*** 
 (2.918) (1.949) (5.676) 
Controls and intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Observations 44,400 44,400 37,712 
Adjusted R-squared 0.216 0.257 0.474 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
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Panel C: Results based on labor share 
  Dependent Variable = Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct  CompAcctAlt1 CompAcctAlt2     
ELS t 1.089*** 0.662*** 2.299*** 
 (14.812) (10.907) (23.425) 
Controls and intercept Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 44,400 44,400 37,712 
Adjusted R-squared 0.230 0.264 0.506 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
 
Panel D: Results based on the composite measure 
  Dependent Variable = Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct  CompAcctAlt1 CompAcctAlt2     
Labor_Comp t 0.171*** 0.103*** 0.324*** 
 (12.034) (8.683) (18.307) 
Controls and intercept Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 44,400 44,400 37,712 
Adjusted R-squared 0.227 0.262 0.494 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating the model (6) using various proxies for labor 
leverage. Panels A, B, C, and D present the results of using labor intensity, union, labor share, and a composite 
measure of aforementioned three individual proxies as an independent variable, respectively. The sample 
consists of 44,400 firm-years for the period 1992−2017. All variables are defined in the Appendix 1. t-statistics 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm and presented below each coefficient. Coefficients of interest are 
bolded. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
  




Address the potential timing bias in the model 
 
Panel A: Including lagged-comparability measure  
  Dependent Variable = Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct CompAcctAlt1 CompAcctAlt2     
Labor_Comp t 0.122*** 0.079*** 0.142***  
(10.137) (7.821) (10.620) 
Comparability t-3 0.461*** 0.456*** 0.475***  
(22.131) (19.634) (35.511) 
Controls and intercept Yes Yes Yes  
       
Observations 29,742 29,742 24,805 
Adjusted R-squared 0.399 0.431 0.622 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
 
 
Panel B: Using only every fourth year of data  
  Dependent Variable = Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct  CompAcctAlt1  CompAcctAlt2      
Labor_Comp t 0.158*** 0.094*** 0.319***  
(9.693) (6.848) (14.711) 
Controls and intercept Yes Yes Yes  
       
Observations 12,279 12,279 9,581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.240 0.288 0.476 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
 
Panel C: Measuring comparability at year t+4  
  Dependent Variable = Comparability t+4 
Variables CompAcct  CompAcctAlt1  CompAcctAlt2      
Labor_Comp t 0.248*** 0.161*** 0.439***  
(14.231) (11.034) (18.015) 
Controls and intercept Yes Yes Yes  
       
Observations 27,619 27,619 26,035 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.258 0.408 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating the model (6) after controlling for the potential 
timing bias in the model. Panel A, B, and C present the results of including lagged-comparability measure, only 
every fourth year of data, and using comparability measured at year t+4, respectively. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix 1. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm and presented below each 
coefficient. Coefficients of interest are bolded. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5  
Exogenous shock of Right-to-Work Law 
 
Panel A: Full sample period  
  Dependent Variable  
= Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct   
PostRTW t -0.246**  
(-2.401) 
Size t 0.297***  
(8.571) 
DIVDUMt  1.071***  
(10.041) 
MTBt  -0.004  
(-0.582) 
Leverage t  -0.959***  
(-4.050) 
CFO5 t  -3.116**  
(-2.504) 
SALES5 t  -0.555*  
(-1.773) 
SalesGrowth t -0.078  
(-1.360) 
Age t -0.012***  
(-4.101) 
Big 4 t -0.145***  
(-3.115) 
Analysts t -0.020**  
(-2.830) 
Spread t 0.026  
(0.868) 
Constant -3.533***  
(-12.342)   
Observations 16,653 
Adjusted R-squared 0.186 
State FE Yes 
Clustered State & Year 
 
Panel B: Exclude observations within four years following the RTW adoption 
  Dependent Variable  
= Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct    
PostRTW t -0.274*  
(-1.795) 
Controls and intercept Yes 
    
Observations 16,335 
Adjusted R-squared 0.188 
State FE Yes 
Clustered State & Year 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating the model (7). Panel A presents the regression 
results based on full sample while panel B presents the results based on the sample excluding observations 
within four years from the RTW adoption to mitigate the concern that measurement of comparability spans 
previous four years. All variables are defined in the Appendix 1. t-statistics are based on standard errors double-
clustered by state and year and presented below each coefficient. Coefficients of interest are bolded. ***, **, 
and * represent significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
 




Cross-sectional analysis  
 
Panel A: The effect of stock return volatility  
  Dependent Variable  = Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct    
Labor_Comp t 0.085*** 
 (4.605) 
RetVoldummy t -1.126*** 
 (-8.375) 
Labor t * RetVoldummy t 0.110*** 
 (5.788)     
Controls and intercept Yes 
  
Observations 44,400 
Adjusted R-squared 0.232 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Clustered Firm 
 
Panel B: The effect of product market competition 
  Dependent Variable  
= Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct    
Labor_Comp t 0.151***  
(9.281) 
HHIdummy t -0.376**  
(-2.569) 
Labor t * HHIdummy t 0.038*  
(1.847) 
Controls and intercept Yes 
  
Observations 44,400 
Adjusted R-squared 0.227 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Clustered Firm 
 
Panel C: The effect of overall firm-level risk 
  Dependent Variable  
= Comparability t 
Variables CompAcct   
Labor_Comp t 0.145***  
(5.706) 
Riskdummy t -0.283**  
(-2.009) 
Labor t * Riskdummy t 0.063***  
(2.578)   
Controls and intercept Yes 
  
Observations 25,010 
Adjusted R-squared 0.229 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Clustered Firm 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of cross-sectional analysis based on the uncertainty in operating 
environment. Panel A, B, and C presents the results of using stock return volatility, product market competition, 
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and overall firm-level risk as a proxy for the uncertainty in operating environment, respectively. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix 1. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm and presented below 
each coefficient. Coefficients of interest are bolded. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
    




The impact of financial statement comparability on the responsiveness of labor decision 
to firm performance 
 
Variables (1) (2) 
      
Chg_ROA t-1 0.061*** -0.017  
(9.37) (-0.39) 
CompAcct t-1  
 
0.003**   
(2.42) 
CompAcct t-1*Chg_ROA t-1  
 
-0.007   
(-0.97) 
Chg_ROADEC      
 
-0.005   
(-1.25) 
Chg_ROA t-1*Chg_ROADEC      
 




0.002   
(1.58) 
CompAcct t-1*Chg_ROA t-1*Chg_ROADEC 
 
0.033***   
(3.16)    
Capex t 0.865*** 0.680*** 
 (33.65) (17.33) 
CapexGrowth t 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (21.52) (12.67) 
Q t-1 0.008*** 0.014***  
(11.28) (7.46) 
Liquidity t-1 0.174*** 0.125***  
(16.90) (7.88) 
Size t-1 0.013*** 0.006***  
(18.73) (4.92) 
Leverage t-1 -0.021*** -0.019**  
(-3.89) (-2.15) 
Maturity t-1 0.000*** -0.000  
(5.10) (-0.16) 
CreditRating t-1 -0.048*** -0.022***  
(-15.14) (-4.83) 
ROA t-1 0.040*** 0.135***  
(7.34) (10.19) 
Constant -0.089*** -0.047***  
(-13.51) (-4.66)    
   
Observations 127,680 54,453 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.100 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating the model (8). All variables are defined in the 
Appendix 1. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm and presented below each coefficient. 
Coefficients of interest are bolded. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
  




The impact of financial statement comparability on the corporate layoffs 
 
 Dependent Variable = 
Variables Large-scale layoff t 
Large-scale 
change in labor t 
Micro-hiring 
management t 
        
CompAcct t-1 -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.002***  
(-8.57) (-8.61) (4.21) 
Capex t -0.473*** -0.472*** -0.129*** 
 (-15.79) (-15.79) (-6.37) 
CapexGrowth t -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.002*** 
 (-13.15) (-13.16) (2.62) 
Q t-1 -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.001  
(-7.94) (-7.94) (0.70) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.048***  
(-0.14) (-0.12) (-4.66) 
Size t-1 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.003***  
(-14.67) (-14.74) (-2.84) 
Leverage t-1 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.007  
(3.50) (3.51) (-0.90) 
Maturity t-1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
(2.59) (2.59) (2.92) 
CreditRating t-1 0.013** 0.013** 0.022***  
(2.09) (2.07) (4.67) 
ROA t-1 -0.262*** -0.262*** 0.034***  
(-17.21) (-17.20) (5.00) 
Constant 0.323*** 0.324*** 0.128***  
(28.04) (28.08) (14.86)     
    
Observations 56,388 56,388 56,388 
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.107 0.016 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Firm Firm Firm 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating the model (9), (10), and (11). All variables are 
defined in the Appendix 1. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm and presented below each 
coefficient. Coefficients of interest are bolded. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
